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From a constitutional perspective, two objectives were at the origin of the idea to have the 
Presidential candidates for the European Commission selected by European party leaders. The 
principal idea was to provide European political parties with an important task and thus to 
convince citizens that they have a choice on the next European political agenda and that there 
is more to the EU than summits of heads of state or government. Derived from this it was 
hoped that turnout in the 2014 elections would benefit from the increased attention given to 
the electoral campaign. 
 
Decreasing voter participation in European elections has been a recurring theme in European 
studies and the theory of the EU’s political legitimacy, while electoral studies have provided 
some limited guidance how to make the European elections a "first-order" event. As overall 
turnout in 2014 barely budged compared to the 2009 elections, the goal to stimulate citizens' 
interest was attained only in some Member States. The paper will defend the proposition that 
one crucial factor to change this is a more influential role of European political parties, 
requiring a solid institutionalisation, notably through the new party statute agreed at the end of 
the 7th parliamentary term. In this context, some national case law impinging on European 
electoral procedure is discussed as an important constraint for giving Euro-parties stronger 
roots in national politics. 
 
On the basis of an assessment of the innovations introduced for the 2014 elections, such as the 
competitive appointment of candidates for the Commission presidency, the paper will also 
scrutinise the viability of further efforts to mobilise the European electorate in times of 
constitutional fatigue, diversity of national traditions and Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs. 
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Writing about European Political Parties (EurPPs or Europarties) risks to appear as a 
Polyannish exercise. Philippe Schmitter and others have seen their essential function for the 
development of a European democracy from the end of the 1960s onwards, about the same 
time when the umbrella party associations of Europe’s major political currents were created. 
Since then, much intellect and passion have been invested in developing ideas how these 
associations, considered insufficient from the point of view of democratic theory and in light 
of empirical studies of political parties, both national and European, could evolve towards a 
status where they enable and carry a competitive debate on European political cleavages. 
While an unbiased observer would certainly agree that progress on this front has been 
painfully slow, it is equally clear that there has been progress nevertheless. 
 
The present paper’s intention is to twofold: it aims at putting Europarties’ development in a 
wider constitutional context, thereby providing reasons to explain why they evolved as they 
did, and scrutinizing some of the arguments usually presented to declare further attempts to 
strengthen their impact on the political life of the Union as futile. Secondly, the article will 
give some recent evidence from the latest revision of the Europarty regulation confirming that 
several important impediments limiting their influence have their origin in the relationship 
between national party central offices and European party networks. An illustration of this can 
be found in the manner the so-called Spitzenkandidaten procedure for the office of President 
of the European Commission was contested, conducted and concluded. 
 
The 2014 European election results led to considerable losses for the traditional centre-right 
parties and the liberals, only small changes for social-democrats, greens and the radical left 
(except in Greece), and a net increase in weight of the eurosceptic or europhobic right. The 
latter seems poised to create a political group in the Parliament under the leadership of the 
French Front national. The less europhobic but still very EU-critical ECR group should gain 
seats by integrating new parties such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Of 
course a country-by-country account would reveal several strong deviations from the Union-
wide trend, such as the extraordinary result of the Partito democratico in Italy (the strongest 
result of any Italian party in nation-wide elections since 1958) or the defeat of Geert Wilders’ 
PVV in the Netherlands. Despite such surprising electoral results in several member states a 
comprehensible reaction to the spectacle which is on display since the votes of the European 
elections have been counted might be "I have seen all this before". One of the key institutional 
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innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the election of the President of the European 
Commission in view of the results of the EP elections, was held to be widely accepted. After 
all, the European People's Party (EPP) and four other European parties had organised 
conferences and online votes to determine the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates) for the 
Commission Presidency. Having thus actively made a bid to personalise the elections and to 
mobilise the electorate party leadership could have been expected to accept the voters' verdict. 
However, Jean-Claude Juncker, the victorious Europe-wide EPP candidate at this moment 
faces increasing headwind from his own party. Although most existing parliamentary groups 
have quickly assembled behind Juncker it was then far from certain that the European Council 
would abide and follow the path presented to citizens during the entire electoral campaign. 
 
This situation illustrated once more that national political parties are the key players of EU 
politics, whereas the European political parties struggle to exert some limited influence on 
selection for office and policy-making. It was some 45 years ago that an American political 
scientist expressed his conviction that "the most important missing element in the Europolity 
[was] a distinctively European party system" and that it was necessary "to break out of 
predominantly national political alliances and form more salient supra-national ones" 
(Schmitter 1970). Since then, a good part of work in EU studies has analysed the tensions 
between member state governments and parties and supranational actors in various theoretical 
frameworks. This paper intends to make an update on the development of a model of EU 
politics including partisan factors which made its appearance some years ago (Hix 2008). It 
will briefly analyse the institutional and ideological arguments of the recent (and on-going) 
power struggle between the Parliament and the Heads of state/government. It will then 
concentrate on the role given in preparation of and during the electoral campaign to the 
EurPPs in their present condition. A third part will then scrutinise recent efforts to make the 
EurPPs more robust and assess the chances for a stabilisation of the new electoral scheme 
installed by the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
 
2. Between institutional design and legislative politics: the European 
Commission as an embryonic EU government? 
 




According to most analyses the banking and sovereign debt crisis 2008-2013 has brought 
about a federalisation of EU financial and budgetary regulation, albeit in guise of a net 
increase of the role of member state governments at the expense of Parliament and the 
Commission (Scicluna 2014). According to common democratic norms this should also 
increase democratic accountability and politicisation of EU-wide decision-making (Habermas 
2014). Such demands are not limited to theorists of democratic norms, as this standard account 
of the need for politicisation, given by a scholar of constitutional law, demonstrates: 
[W]e should not be surprised to see that European citizens disagree about the kind of 
policy measures that are the best response to the financial crisis and other political issues 
that the EU rightly addresses through legislation. It is a mistake to insist, as national 
politicians invariably do when they defend the measures taken at late night Council 
meetings under the current regime of executive dominated intergovernmentalism, that 
there is no alternative to the decision they have made. For many citizens, that is the 
reason why they turn their backs on Europe: They do not like the policy choices 
generated on the European level, and there is no alternative personnel and menu of 
policy options present to engage with on the European level, so they associate Europe 
with those policy choices they deem undesirable. If faced with a genuine choice in 
personnel, programmes and policies, disgruntled citizens would be able to articulate 
their dissent not by turning away from Europe and seeking refuge in populist recipes. 
They might instead, as European citizens, vote or mobilize for an alternative Europe, 
personified in a different President, committed to different policies. Tying the outcome 
of the European elections to the determination who will be the next Commission 
President will lead not only to a surge of interest in European parliamentary elections 
and allow the Commission to more effectively fulfil the functions assigned to it, it is also 
likely to be the best antidote to the spread of nationalist populism and Euroscepticism. 
(Kumm 2013, p. 19) 
 
Such constitutional arguments are strengthened by opinion polls which show, even quite 
recently, that a majority of EU citizens trusts the supranational legislatures more than the 
national ones (see below). Other polls have repeatedly shown that the ill-fated constitutional 
treaty had wide support in the general population of many member states (Zürn 2006), 







Even a cursory look at the recent debate over the appointment of the Commission President 
makes clear that policy choices for the EU and institutional power games are as closely 
intertwined as we have seen many times before. For instance, in an invited article David 
Cameron advanced several constitutional arguments and remained quite vague on policy 
choices except for his well-known demands for reform of the EU towards more “openness, 
flexibility, and growth”. He insisted on the fact that the EPP lead candidate had not been not 
on any electoral list and that the initiative of MEPs and other political leaders to create a quasi-
obligation to appoint the candidate proposed by the winning party was taken “behind closed 
doors” and did not correspond to what the treaties provided for. In his view, this created a 
major obstacle to find the best qualified candidates, notably heads of state or government. 
Other important British papers openly call the drive for Jean-Claude Juncker’s nomination an 
illegitimate “power grab” of the European Parliament, in David Cameron’s words “breaching 
the EU's rules by the back door. Rules that have been ratified by our national parliaments and 
laid down in international law.”2 
 
Many objections could be raised against these views. Suffice it to say here that since the 
departure of Jacques Delors many national leaders have not distinguished themselves by 
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chosing the most competent and dynamic candidates for the Commission Presidency. 
Politicians such as the late Jean-Luc Dehaene or Guy Verhofstadt were openly resisted by 
some member states for the principal reason that they seemed to have some intentions to push 
for more integration. It could also be questioned why some national leaders came out with 
open resistance against the idea of chosing the Commission president through the Parliament 
only after the elections. David Cameron can point to the fact that the British Conservatives 
(and their European counterpart ECR) never shared this idea and did not select a 
Spitzenkandidat. For many other leaders, however, it is doubtful how they could explain their 
change of position between the election campaign and since the elections. They could have 
decided not to name a candidate, and defend their reasons to the electorate. The fact that they 
decided not to do so indicates that they realised that the idea had its democratic merits (or they 
did not want to face public opinion and make the case for the intergovernmental method of 
appointing the president). From a legal perspective, Cameron’s most convincing argument is 
that Art. 17(7) TEU, which leaves some room for interpretation, is precisely the result of a 
compromise obtained during the European Convention in 2002/2003, for the very same 
differences of view as emerge now. 
 
The idea of popular European democracy, which would modestly manifest itself in the 
election of the Commission President through voters’ verdict, is of course closely related to 
plans for creating a European government. Although former Commission President Prodi’s 
sporadic hints at transforming the Commission into a European government were not well 
received in politics and academia, it remains true that if democracy is the preferable mode of 
choosing and controlling governments, then any political system, at whatever level, should 
respect its basic tenets and rules. However, beyond the “jealous” defence of national political 
parties (notably their leadership and rising stars) of the “powers they have to control ‘their’ 
agents in the EU institutions” (Hix 2008, p. 1263), European representative democracy finds 
itself criticised and attacked from other sides, too. First, many scholars and practitioners today 
consider electoral politics as inefficient for modern public policy-making. They recommend 
placing market regulation and other public policies under the responsibility of non-
majoritarian institutions such as the European Central Bank or regulatory agencies. Second, 
participatory democracy involving citizens more directly, for instance through referendums, 
has become a powerful proposition inspiring not only NGOs and other activists but also many 
political leaders and parties, notably the Greens and some sections of centre-right and centre-
left parties. This, however, has to be contrasted with the empirical observation that European 
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integration, at least so far, has clearly privileged party central offices over party congresses or 
activists (Carter and Poguntke 2010). 
 
True, both critiques of representative democracy and party rule are directed as much at the 
national as at the European level (Mair 2008). But European democracy faces a number of 
specific obstacles we don’t find in nation states. The normative terminology necessary to 
develop an understanding of whether European democracy is satisfactory or inadequate, 
workable or impractical, desirable or dangerous, are mostly derived from national liberal 
democracies of the 20th century. This creates a “Catch 22” situation: while most would agree 
that a simple transfer of the principal trappings of national democratic systems to the next 
higher level is insufficient or perhaps even plainly wrong, the old conceptual tool box is 
unavoidable when we attempt to describe and design a democratic system in a non-state 
context (Schimmelfennig 2010). Despite these limitations, this paper will discuss the 
competitive character of parallel accountability structures and the existence of fused channels 
of political representation as unique – and problematic - features of European democracy. 
 
 
2.2 Participatory democracy, a challenge for party democracy? 
 
A vast body of research has taken note of the fact that since the entry into force of the 
Maastricht treaty referendums have become a frequent appearance at constitutional moments 
of the EU's development (Hooghe/Marks 2009). Only a handful of member states has so far 
resisted the pressure to go for referendums. One paradox of referendums is that they are often 
initiated by the political or party leadership for reasons having little to do with the question at 
hand, such as governmental power consolidation or resolution of party-internal divisions. 
Their results are of course open and sometimes constrain or even defy political leadership for a 
long period of time (Hobolt 2006). 
 
Referendums are on simple dichotomous Yes/No decisions, risk to raise strong emotions and 
determine the political climate for years to come. While voters at elections have a choice of 
different ideologies and platforms, in referendums they are held to take their pick for one of 
two simple alternatives. Referendums are also known to attract voters who express 
disagreement more easily than those who support a given policy. Furthermore, negative votes 
are more likely than positive ones to be caused by a variety of different, sometimes opposite 
reasons. A last problem with referendums is that some voters may in general be pro-European 
yet still distance themselves from certain aspects of the multi-faceted integration project and 
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therefore vote No on an all-encompassing proposition such as the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. 
 
This analysis would not be complete without mentioning the sociology of European 
citizenship. According to UN statistics there about 2-3% of the world population migrating to 
other countries at any given time. This corresponds exactly to the number of citizens living in 
another EU member state beyond short stays for private or professional reasons. That internal 
EU mobility is scarcely higher than global migration movements reflects in some way 
Europeans’ cultural, linguistic and professional immobility. Not surprisingly, less than 15% of 
the EU population identify themselves exclusively or primarily as Europeans, whereas around 
40% have an exclusive national identity. European identity is primarily an attribute of the 
highly educated and well-to-do (Magnette/Papadopoulos 2008, Schmitter 2009). And this 
situation has not improved since the onset of the public debt crisis: in a traditionally europhile 
country such as Italy, to name but one example, the net percentage of citizens trusting the EU 
fell from + 30% to - 22% between 2007 and 2012.3 
 
In conclusion, both currently discussed alternatives to party and electoral democracy fail to 
provide conclusive arguments in favour of replacing or restricting the traditional avenues of 
democratic legitimation. As far as new governance is concerned there may be an attractive 
methodological feature: its preparedness to experiment and to develop steps for incremental 
change and its flexibility to react to yet unknown demands. If we consider European 
integration as an "experiment in identity formation in the absence of the chief force that has 
shaped [national] identity in the past"4 such flexibility might indeed be an important 
improvement compared to the established conflict lines characterising nation-states' 
sovereignty issues. However, the willingness to turn to such experimentation would need to 
emerge among a critical mass of decision-makers. Otherwise it would seem highly unlikely 




2.3 It’s the elite, stupid: the re-emergence of identity as a legal and political category 
 
Continuing the experiment of European democracy will certainly need the capacity to look for 
new legal and political instruments. The example of the nation-state is deeply engrained in our 
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historical memories and still determines to a large extent current geopolitical strategies. 
Building a European democracy hence faces strong headwinds, not only from voters and 
national political elites but also from academia and constitutional courts. Against this it is 
useful to remember that democracy is about the exercise of public power—and it is beyond 
doubt that the Union exercises public power (Weiler 2012). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that the political and legal developments since Maastricht have inched the former "constitution 
of the market closer to a constitutionalism grounded in comprehensive principles of political 
legitimacy, however incomplete this process may still be” (Isiksel 2012). 
 
One of the most enduring arguments against European democracy, rehearsed in many different 
ways over the last 30 years of European Union scholarship and case-law, is the lack of 
European identity and a European public space. The rather optimistic perspective of neo-
functionalism that transnational functional interests would create an unstoppable dynamic of 
increasing interdependence, which would then make necessary supranational problem-solving 
of ever growing scope and intensity, accompanied the heady days of the Delors Commission 
and several treaties extending the European Parliament's powers. However, in parallel at least 
two other strands of legal and academic commentary painted a less sanguine picture of the 
future of Europe. Liberal intergovernmentalism insisted that supranational strategies remained 
under the firm control of member states and were an expression of the economic interests of 
national elites. On the legal front, a small number of national constitutional courts, under the 
guidance of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BvG), questioned the primacy of 
European law over national constitutional provisions and repeatedly issued reservations 
defining a core of national sovereignty untouchable by EU legal acts. A considerable amount 
of legal doctrine, popularized in widely read newspapers, followed in their wake and 
maintained that European democracy was an oxymoron: no demos, no democracy (recently 
Grimm 2013, partially supported by Habermas 2014). 
 
This line of reasoning remained relatively innocuous for a long time. But the confluence of the 
public debt crisis in some member states and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (a watered-
down but nevertheless substantially similar version of the doomed Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe) drove the BvG's arguments into the new territory of "constitutional 
identity".5 Democracy as the effective possibility to influence policy decisions and electoral 
equality had long been central tenets of BvG doctrine with respect to European integration. 
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However, in its Lisbon decision6 and in a subsequent case on the minimum electoral threshold 
for the European elections the BvG went further than that and maintained that the German 
constitution required a core of legislative and political powers which was enumerated in the 
decision. If these powers were emasculated below a (yet unspecified) level German citizens 
would lose their constitutionally guaranteed effective influence on national policy decisions. 
Combined with the so-called eternity clause of the Basic Law this led the Court to the 
conclusion that the Basic Law could only be changed in this respect by the German people 
directly.7 
 
The court goes to great lengths to expound on the fact that the Staatenverbund is an 
association of sovereign national states and to detail the conditions for a state to remain 
sovereign. Particular interest has been provoked by the mentioned list of inalienable state 
rights which can never be transferred to European law-making if the constitutional identity and 
sovereignty of member states is to be respected. This list is a list of "pure political expediency" 
– with the Court naming almost all policies where member state control is still exclusive or at 
least predominant – and not one of principled constitutional interpretation.8 Other authors 
agree that the list is a simple compilation and protection of remaining national powers. 
 
There are also long tracts of the judgment speaking about the importance of democracy as a 
constitutive element for the sovereignty of a member state, notably Germany. It is in these 
paragraphs that the BvG considers the European Parliament to be structurally unable ever to 
become a source of direct democratic legitimacy. The main reason for this, according to the 
court, is the very strong discrepancy between the electoral impacts of citizens from different 
member states. This is presented as an unacceptable violation of the principle of electoral 
equality, which is also jeopardized by the attribution of EP seats according to national quota. 
Finally, the court felt obliged, contrary to the Maastricht decision, to elaborate in great detail 
that the Basic Law prohibits the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to an eventual 
European federal state. Only the constituent power itself - the people - could make such a 
decision. 
 
The BvG recognised that the Lisbon Treaty changes the Parliament's character so that it will 
no longer consist of "representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
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constitutional moment or some less radical option such as a constitutional convention of the Herrenchiemsee 
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8 Schönberger 2009, p. 1209 
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Community" but of "representatives of the Union's citizens". Yet, it does not give this any 
importance for its reasoning on democratic legitimacy at European level. In fact, neither the 
right to stand in European elections nor the right to vote in any given state is based on 
possession of the nationality of that state. According to Article 22 (2) TFEU, every citizen of 
the Union residing in any member state "shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in elections to the European Parliament in the member state in which he resides under the 
same conditions as nationals of that state." It is one of the key features of European citizenship 
that one qualifies for participation in European and local elections irrespective of nationality, 
the right depending instead on residence only. For this reason alone, each Member of the 
European Parliament not only represents the nationals of a given state but all citizens of the 
Union, not least foreign residents of the member state where (s)he stands for election. 
 
Instead of taking these incremental steps towards transnational democracy seriously the court 
constructs a constitutional dead end: it describes an idea of egalitarian and majoritarian 
parliamentary democracy which can only apply in full to centralized states; it is already 
inappropriate to account for federal States, including Germany, and cannot be made to fit the 
constitutional system of the European Union. This type of legal reasoning may be a general 
problem of constitutional law, which seems to think in terms of rights and equality whereas 
politics involves, at its core, the organization of power. According to an American 
constitutionalist it may be preferable to leave behind “[u]nderstandings of rights or equality 
worked out in other domains of constitutional law” because they were simply a bad fit for the 
regulation of politics (Pildes 2004). 
 
Coming back to the European situation, the BvG ostensibly ignores the European Parliament's 
efforts to create a European political landscape. Its remarkable silence on the extra-
institutional conditions for meaningful democracy at national and European level may insofar 
hint at substantive indecision within the court. As Wonka has argued, the European Parliament 
provides an institutional venue which could fulfil the function of creating public awareness of 
EU decisions, and has done so increasingly.9 The exaggerated weight given by the BvG to the 
principle of electoral equality leaves aside the importance to select the appropriate political 
personnel obtaining the mandate to govern and legislate at a particular level. There is a weak 
link indeed between EU citizens' formal weight of vote and the resulting political mandate and 
success of the parliamentarians that represent them in the House. The court has further 
underlined its doubts about the EP’s democratic legitimacy when it abolished the electoral 
                                                                
9  Wonka 2010, p. 58 
12 
 
threshold for the 2014 European elections despite strong criticism of German MEPs and most 
German MPs, thereby inviting a handful of German eurosceptic or otherwise colourful parties 
to take their seats in the Parliament, with most of them having just one MEP.10 The Court may 
thus merit the honorary title, in an unexpected outlet, of being “the last safeguard of our nation 
states against [EU] encroachment”11 but ignore the necessity of finding a compromise 
“between the international law principle of the equality of states and the democratic principle 
of ‘one man one vote’” (Duff 2014). 
 
Finally, the European Citizens' Initiative introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will significantly 
enhance citizens' influence on the political agenda of the EU legislator. MEPs consider this 
new instrument of citizen participation to be of paramount importance for the further evolution 
of European democracy. It may turn out not only to become a constructive version of 
participatory democracy at the European level, but also a convincing element of European 
citizenship. 
 
We can conclude that exploring the prospects and limits of representative European 
democracy has acquired a new meaning over the past few years. Originally an idealistic 
political project to prepare "ever closer union" of the citizens of the EU, the construction of an 
autonomous and legitimate democratic system at the European level now appears to become a 
necessary rectification of the logic of coupling democracy with the nation state. The European 
Parliament, in agreement with a prolific body of scholarship, has upheld that the legitimacy of 
the EU is fed by two streams, one flowing from the democratically elected member state 
governments, the other from EU citizens enjoying the right to vote for the European 
Parliament as an important part of European citizenship. If one of these streams is deliberately 
cut off by national constitutional case law, the question of non-nationally derived legitimacy is 
back on the table with new urgency. Failing to reinvigorate it may make further 
democratization of the EU impossible, as well as create a major impediment to effective 
policy-making, e.g. in creating a credible defence against the public debt crisis. 
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3. European parliamentary representation through parties 
 
3.1 The upside-down character of European federalism 
 
In reaction to the failed effort of drawing up a Constitution for Europe and the subsequent case 
law new theories of integration such as post-functionalism have been put forward. An 
important element of these theories is the endogenization of national identity and the role of 
political parties and entrepreneurs (Hooghe/Marks 2009). Post-functionalists believe that 
identity is particularly influential for the general public, much more so than for functional 
interest groups. When regional integration extends to the political as well as the economic 
political parties seeking votes and trying to minimize internal conflict determine whether an 
issue is politicized or not. Since the inception of the public debt crisis this seems to create 
"downward pressure on the level and scope of integration".12 Post-functionalists also include 
geopolitical factors in their models. For instance, inter-state rivalries are factored in as impacts 
on elite decision making that are more powerful than economic interdependence. 
 
Taking the reflection on political parties one step further Philippe Schmitter displays elegantly 
the ambivalent nature of our current situation. While "this is not the time to found a political 
party or to expect that any party – whatever the level of aggregation – will be able to perform 
the functions attributed to it in the past", he is on the other hand convinced that the best - in 
any case the most logical -  response to the current "elite–mass gap in expectations and for re-
fashioning multiple collective identities according to different levels of political aggregation, 
the place to go would be the eventual formation of a supra-national European party system."13 
 
Ever since Schattschneider's 1942 statement that "modern democracy is unthinkable save in 
terms of the parties" research has attributed a central role of political representation to political 
parties. Scholars such as Peter Mair, Bernard Manin and many others have analysed the way 
parties have changed their appearance and functioning since World War II. The representative 
functions of parties became particularly vital at a time when distinctions based on property 
ceased to be necessary qualifications for the right to vote (Schlozman et al. 2012, Mair 2008). 
Obviously much of this research has dealt with national parties. However, the nascent EurPPs 
have to face a very similar environment of public opinion. To some extent European parties 
epitomize evolutions that have been observed in national democracies: a high concentration of 
power at the top, a lack of party membership and a certain withdrawal from voters' concerns 
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and aspirations. In consequence, they face a double challenge: convincing voters of the utility 
of representative democracy at the European level and persuading national party leaders that 
the emergence of a European political landscape might also be in their own interest. 
 
National political parties are deeply entrenched in territorial rule. They faithfully reflect all 
sorts of administrative, linguistic and cultural boundaries (Lehmann 2011b), which makes it 
difficult to motivate their leadership politically to go beyond the existing set-up of nation-
states. However, there are no strong theoretical or empirical arguments for the belief that the 
nation state is the final geographical and political destination of democratic legitimacy. And 
there are no reasons to hope that an EU demos or polis is “quietly gathering strength and 
substance, ready to emerge fully-formed at an indeterminate date in the near future”.14 
Therefore, since 2004, with the support of the Commission, the European Parliament has 
promoted and adopted EU regulations to further the development of EurPPs and European 
political foundations. 
 
3.2 A new regime of party finance and its eveolution towards a party statute 
 
In 2003 Parliament and Council (under qualified majority) decided to adopt Regulation (EC) 
No 2004/2003 on political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding.15 It 
stipulates that a political party at European level shall satisfy the following conditions: 
 
a) it must have legal personality in the member state in which its seat is located;  
b) it must be represented, in at least one quarter of member states, by Members of the 
European Parliament or in the national Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the 
regional assemblies, or it must have received, in at least one quarter of the member states, 
at least 3% of the votes cast in each of those member states at the most recent European 
Parliament elections;  
c) it must observe, in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which 
the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law;  
d) it must have participated in elections to the European Parliament, or have expressed the 
intention to do so. 
 
The Regulation states furthermore that a political party at European level shall publish its 
revenue and expenditure and a statement of its assets and liabilities annually and declare its 
sources of funding by providing a list specifying the donors and the donations received from 
each donor, with the exception of donations not exceeding EUR 500. It shall not accept: 
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- anonymous donations, 
- donations from the budgets of political groups in the European Parliament, 
- donations from any undertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly 
or indirectly a dominant influence, 
- donations exceeding EUR 12000 per year and per donor from any natural or legal 
person. 
 
Contributions from political parties which are members of a political party at European level 
shall be admissible but may not exceed 40 % of that party's annual budget. Funding charged to 
the general budget of the European Union shall not exceed 75 % of the budget of a political 
party at European level. The burden of proof shall rest with the party. Funds from the general 
budget of the European Union or from any other source may not be used for the direct or 
indirect funding of other political parties, and in particular national political parties. It is 
prohibited to intervene, financially or otherwise, in national referendums. 
 
The last two provisions incarnate the concerns of national political leadership about undue 
influence from the EU level. The restriction to campaign in referendums is an evident bulwark 
against the diffusion of Europe-wide political platforms at strategic moments. Parties' 
influence on the selection of candidates remains for the moment almost negligible (European 
Parliament 2009). Their financial means for electoral campaigns are feeble and continue to be 
under the Damocles sword of national regulation. National party leadership is quite nervous 
about possible minimal influence on the internal decision procedures coming from the 
European “outsiders” (who, in any case, are dependent upon these national leaders for the 
further advancement of their career), as is displayed by the cautious wording in the regulation 
on the cross-financing of national parties. Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
(AFCO) hence continues to explore further steps to make the Euro-parties more important 
players in EU politics. 
 
In a resolution adopted in 2011, on the practical experiences gained with the regime for party 
and foundation finance established in 2004/200716 the Parliament draws some conclusions 
with a view to the next initiatives to take. The resolution recalls that the Treaty of Lisbon 
stresses the role of political parties and their foundations to create a European polis, a political 
space at EU level, and a European democracy. However, European political parties, as they 
stand, “are not in a position to play this role to the full” because they are merely umbrella 
organisations for national parties and have no roots in the electorate in the member states. 
Political parties should therefore have rights, obligations and responsibilities as legal entities 





and should follow converging general organisational patterns. An authentic legal status for 
EurPPs and a legal personality of their own, based directly on the law of the European Union, 
would enable the parties and their political foundations to act as representative agents of the 
European public interest. In their information campaigns the Euro-parties should interact and 
compete on matters relating to common European challenges. 
 
The proposals of the subsequent AFCO report adopted in April 201317 may appear quite 
technical at first sight but enhance the European parties’ status vis-à-vis their national 
counterparts: the envisaged regulation defines and implements a legal base for the 
establishment of a European party in EU law from 2017. Euro-parties are, for the moment, 
obliged to register their head offices in one of the member states (normally Belgium) under 
national rules. With respect to the ban to contribute to the financing of referendum campaigns, 
Parliament has long called for a right of Europarties to participate in referendum campaigns as 
long as the subject of the referendum has a direct link with issues concerning the European 
Union. 
 
The 2013 Parliament resolution led to trialogue negotiations with Council and Commission in 
view of a first reading agreement. The main results, adopted in April 2014, are as follows:18 
 European political parties and foundations acquire European legal personality by 
conversion of the national legal personality into a successor European legal 
personality. 
 Registration conditions verify the respect of values on which the EU is founded, 
including observance of EU values by national member parties. 
 An independent authority is created for the purpose of registration/verification/de-
registration of parties and foundations. It is advised by a Committee of independent 
eminent persons. 
 The consequences of manifest and serious violations of EU values or failure to fulfil 
other obligations are defined; the Court of Justice of the European Union may review 
the legality of the decisions of the Authority. 
 Flexibility elements for the funding of foundations are introduced, concerning multi-
annual programming and carry-over provisions. 
 Europarties obtain the formal right to fund EP election activities. However, they may 
not nominate EP candidates or finance campaigns in the context of referendums 
(including those on European issues). 
 
Some member states will need to adopt complementary national laws to ensure an effective 
application of the Regulation and obtain a sufficient transitional period to that end. The 
regulation is to enter into force on 1st January 2017; a review will be carried out before the 
end of 2019. 
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3.3 The internal decision-making mechanisms of European political parties: a leftover 
for reform 
 
Bardi et al. (2014) are in general quite reserved about the chances for a satisfactorily 
operational European party system but they suggest some ideas on how to homogenize 
ideological platforms, improve inter-party cooperation and streamline internal democratic 
processes. Such ideas concern issues which have not yet caught the attention of most active 
MEPs. They also indicate some problems but also some future avenues for reform, some of 
which have also been presented by the former Secretary General of the Parliament (Priestley 
2010). He notably challenges Euro-parties to accept the possibility for individuals to become 
direct members of such a party. Recruiting individual members and activists who are more 
visible for public opinion would democratize internal party procedures (e.g., through a system 
of qualified majority votes on posts and platforms, more influence for party delegates sent to 
congresses, designation by secret ballot of a candidate for the Commission presidency, 
possibly in open primaries). 
 
Until recently, the statutes of only one European political party, the EUDemocrats - Alliance 
for a Europe of Democracies (EUD), allowed for full individual membership of any citizen 
who might be interested to join. One year ago, the Liberal party (ALDE) created associate 
membership for individuals who may not be members of a national party. Associate members 
are able to participate and be a candidate in online elections that will select the delegate(s) 
representing associate members at the yearly ALDE Party Congress. Membership of the other 
parties is restricted to national parties or MEPs. But attitudes seem to change in some Euro-
parties. At a workshop organised in January 2011, the vice-chairperson of the European Green 
Party announced that the Greens would soon envisage a change of their statutes in this 
direction. However, the latest Rule Book of the European Green Party of May 2013 does not 
provide for this possibility.19 
 
The Parliament had long emphasised the need for all EurPPs to conform to the highest 
standards of internal party democracy (democratic election of party bodies, democratic 
decision-making processes, including for the selection of candidates). However, strong 
hesitations to open Euro-parties for individual membership remain. In spite of much talk at the 
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top of new means of participatory democracy parties themselves remain very hierarchical 
organisations, with strict chains of command at and between the various levels of aggregation. 
It follows that these command chains are closely watched by party leadership. Any proposal 
for change is examined for its likely effects on the present party leadership. Most incumbents 
hesitate to introduce changes which could jeopardize their chances for re-nomination or their 
control powers of the internal party workings. Under such conditions problems such as starkly 
varying membership from different countries will certainly be very difficult to resolve. Some 
system of quotas, vote weights such as super-qualified majorities or other balancing acts will 
be necessary. One important practical expression of party democracy was the selection of 
candidates for the Commission presidency before the 2014 elections. 
 
 
3.4 Tinkering at the margins? Consequences of asymmetric electoral representation 
 
Both channels of democratic legitimation of the EU are predominantly determined by the same 
principal, national party leadership. This is no new insight. In 1987, Reif and Niedermayer 
noted that there was a “marked discrepancy” between the function nominally attributed to the 
European Parliament and its real function, notably a mismatch between high constitutional 
expectations and the practical design of the vote.20 Indeed, the 1976 European Electoral Act 
revised in 2002 only stipulates the general principles of the proportional vote, incompatibility 
with a national parliamentary mandate and a maximum threshold of 5%. All other necessary 
provisions on campaign rules, design of the ballot, apportionment of seats and many others 
remain under the control of national legislation. One result of this is that on campaign posters 
and in other media the Europarties only exceptionally appear with their own logos and 
platforms. In addition, national party leadership selects the candidates for the European 
elections. This reduces the Europarties' influence and visibility to a very low level (EP 2009). 
 
A few scholars have developed ideas to improve this situation. Some of them appear almost 
utopian, others may be partially realized over the medium-term. Simms (2012) reflects on 
chances for a “new pan-European party” which would aim to gain a majority in the European 
Parliament in European elections or, if this turned out to be difficult, to win majorities in the 
respective national legislatures (or both). This should then lead to the emergence of a pan-
European party landscape. 
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In a more realistic vein, Schleicher identified conflicts between the goal of making the EP a 
direct popular check of the Commission and the Council (its institutional purpose) and the way 
the elections are organized (2011). He underlines that there are practical tools to create 
electoral incentives that accord an advantage to territorially based parties which are willing to 
appeal to voters other than those of their own constituency. The question raised by Schleicher 
is thus whether electoral rule change can provide a tool for realigning institutional purpose and 
practical implementation. The most radical idea is to require parties to attain a certain 
threshold of votes in more than one member state. Drawing inspiration from the regulation on 
Europarties which requires parties to be present or to campaign in at least a quarter of the 
member states, a party presenting candidates for election to the European Parliament would 
need to have a minimum electoral success in several member states and appear on the ballot 
separately from the national parties. This would allow the Euro-party brands to develop 
identities over time that were separate from those of their domestic partners. It would also 
limit the ability of candidates to make purely nationalistic appeals that would be unpopular in 
other countries, as candidates from a Euro-party in one country could be held accountable for 
things said by their co-partisans in another country. 
 
A less problematic proposal, taken up by other authors (Oelbermann et al. 2011), concerns the 
design of the ballots used in European elections, which should not carry the acronyms of 
national parties but those of their European partners. There may be linguistic details to be 
sorted out but from a rational-choice perspective such a seemingly small change would enable 
voters to exercise their accountability function in direct relation to the European parties. This 
would of course take time over several electoral cycles but, as Schleicher puts it, it would 
allow electors to establish “running tallies” of the political decisions made by European 
parties, thus clarifying the purpose of the vote. Finally, since in most modern elections the 
most relevant tool voters have for overcoming their ignorance of politics is the heuristic 
provided by a political party (cf. also Manin 1997) the repeated practices of voters would 
contribute to growing an understanding of European politics. Two problems with Schleicher’s 
ideas may occur: (1) On what political issues should EP voters form their “running tallies” if 
few salient policies are decided at the EU level, and if due to the institutional compromises 
prevalent in European decision-making no clear impact of separate parties can be singled out? 
(2) There have already been warnings from MEPs and academic commentators that turnout 
may fall even further due to new and foreign-sounding party names. This development can of 




The last argument brings us to the European Parliament’s proposals for electoral reform 
because similar objections have been raised against the introduction of a single EU-wide 
constituency for a small number of additional MEPs (Duff 2010). MEPs have argued, for 
instance, that such a constituency would create a two-class system of MEPs, that it would 
intensify the personalization and mediatization of electoral campaigns, and that the 
presentation of foreign-sounding candidates would alienate voters even more than is the case 
now. The rapporteur’s rejoinder was that “the addition of a transnational list elected from a 
pan-EU constituency would enhance the popular legitimacy of the European Parliament by 
widening voter choice. The voter would be able to articulate politically his or her plural 
citizenship, one national, the other European: two votes are better than one.”21 One could add 
that, as we have seen above in the analysis of modern representative democracy, 
personalization and mediatization are not at all limited to European elections and that in view 
of the lack of interest at present this might be an acceptable price to pay. One problem with a 
two-votes system is that many voters are not used to it although it would be less of a problem 
in federal systems such as Germany where the Bundestag is elected more or less the same way 
(Erst- und Zweitstimme). 
 
The proposal for electoral reform was sent back to committee in May 2011 and will only be 
taken up again during the next term. One reason for this is that some elements of the proposal 
would require treaty revision. Other proposals in AFCO’s report, such as the introduction of 
semi-open party lists or improving the franchise for citizens living in other member states, will 
hopefully be part of the renewed reform effort. Perhaps the most radical effect of these 
changes of the electoral procedure would be to confront the EurPPs with an important political 
challenge: to select the candidates for the EU-wide constituency and to stage an effective 
campaign for them. This would in all likelihood transform the posture of Europarties over the 
years and enable them to acquire a more independent role with respect to national party 
structures. It would open a host of necessities and possibilities for inter-party communication 
and cooperation, Europe-wide head-hunting for suitable candidates and new energies for the 
implementation of interesting proposals to europeanize the European elections: use Euro-party 
acronyms on ballot papers, require Euro-parties to obtain a certain percentage of votes in more 
than one member state and other instruments to make regular public appearances of non-
national politicians the rule rather than the exception. 
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One day this might even radiate to the selection of other MEP candidates. It has of course been 
argued that to elect only 25 MEPs on the new transnational quota is insufficient to interest the 
Europarties to spend significant resources on the campaign. However, this claim probably 
underestimates the novelty effect and the media impact of a cross-border campaign. The 
disproportionate press coverage received by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders on their project 
of uniting several Eurosceptic parties in order to obtain group status in the EP is a case in 
point. Moreover, the selection duty would have to be combined with clearer party programmes 
and a more proactive behaviour with respect to the election of the Commission President. 
There is a certain amount of research showing that parties which display a clear position on 
European issues do better in the EP elections than others (Lord 2010). 
 
In summary, the EU-wide constituency would bring about most of the advantages of multi-
state thresholds without some of their drawbacks. Plural thresholds might well be a further 
step of reform once an EU-wide constituency is well established. These proposals are certainly 
not sufficient to create the necessary conditions for a lively political debate at the European 
level but would need the restructuring of EurPPs outlined above (Bardi et al. 2014). 
 
 
3.5 Towards a parliamentary system? The presentation of candidates for Commission 
President 
 
One of the key measures in bringing about the 'Europeanisation' of the parliamentary elections, 
more lively intra-party democracy, and higher voter participation is the nomination of 
candidates for President of the European Commission. In this regard, the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution on 4 July 2013 on improving practical arrangements for the 2014 
parliamentary elections22 calling on the EurPPs to nominate candidates for the Presidency of 
the European Commission, who should present their political programmes in all member 
states. This initiative has finally been accepted by national leaders despite some resistance 
(Hobolt 2014). The five Europarty candidates participated in several television debates, 
campaigned in most member states and were covered extensively in the press. However, the 
impact of this on voter turn-out has been regrettably weak. One reason for this is the highly 
uneven media presence between member states. While the Spitzenkandidaten were very 
visible and much talked about in Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Poland and Austria their public 
presence was much weaker in other countries (notably France and the UK). A general 





conclusion of most commentary on the Spitzenkandidaten was summarised thus by Sarah 
Hobolt (2014): Spitzenkandidaten did not define the agenda of the 2014 European elections 
but, in the long term, In the long term, it may even reshape the nature of European elections.23 
Some observers from the sideline indeed speak already of the fact that under Jean-Claude 
Juncker the Commission is “Parliament’s Commission” rather than “Council’s 
Commission”.24 
 
There are of course advocates of a non-partisan profile of the Commission, David Cameron 
among them, and authors warning to go down the way towards a parliamentary system. 
Indeed, the current institutional structure of the EU resembles more a presidential or 
separated-powers system (Kreppel 2011). Any move towards a more parliamentary system 
with its dynamics of “government” and opposition parties may bring surprises with respect to 
the acceptance of the Commission’s proposals in Parliament or, vice versa, the reaction of the 
Commission to parliamentary legislative initiatives. A further institutional aspect are the 
absolute majorities required for many legislative decision (e.g., at third reading), which make 
it necessary that the major groups cooperate. Even if the President of the Commission were 
elected by a clear-cut majority in both EU "chambers" - the governments gathered in the 
Council being considered as a kind of European Bundesrat - he would have to compromise, 
notably to confront the problem of forging majorities in the EP and of adapting to shifting 
balances in the Council (Magnette/Papadopoulos 2008). 
 
However, the political dynamics developing in all parties are a true innovation. The quality 
media’s reactions have been very positive and the means at the disposal of the top candidates 
appeared sufficient. European parties were allowed to support their candidates. In addition, 
there seems to be strong cohesion on this point among newly elected MEPs and EP groups. 
The travails the European Council went through to accept the idea of losing power in this 
appointment makes it uncertain that future Commission Presidents will also be chosen among 
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In Renaud Dehousse's words, the EU suffers not primarily from a democratic but from a 
political deficit. Major decisions concerning the EU are taken in an ambiance of “There is no 
alternative”, with little contestation between right and left. Many MEPs are painfully aware of 
this when they start to campaign. Being obliged to start out stereotypically by acknowledging 
that all mainstream parties are pro-European neuters electoral campaigns for the European 
Parliament and inhibits MEPs to spell out their convictions. One way out of this might be that 
the mass pro-integration parties in Europe regain lost ground in the battle over European 
integration by living up to the facts of politicization. The way to do this, at least for some 
observers, would be to politicize Europe along the left/right cleavage. As a result, European 
issues ought to be framed in terms of the direction of European policies rather than with regard 
to European integration (Börzel/Risse 2009). The political refusal, by left and right, to focus 
on economic distribution and the management of the economy for production and distribution 
may need to be abandoned for arriving at such a politicization (Mair 2008), which could tackle 
the widespread view that voters have, before anything else, concern for the nature and status of 
their nation state. “Often it is not necessarily EU policy that [voters] reject, only the fact that is 
the EU's” (Simon Jenkins, The Guardian, 30 April 2014). 
 
The seemingly technical improvements discussed by some researchers and by the Parliament 
should be seen as incremental steps to prepare full-fledged electoral campaigning at the 
European level. This strategy is not without risks as it may provide a platform for jingoist 
political entrepreneurs along the tan dimension found by Hooghe and Marks (2009). The 
optimistic bet would be that feelings of territorial and social identity are the result of acquiring 
legal, cultural and political habits and of sustained interaction between citizens and their 
political institutions at various levels. On the other hand, the power of incumbents in political 
office and of existing legal and political accountability structures can hardly be overestimated. 
Resistance to change can certainly be explained in a framework of rational choice theories, 
postulating that those who benefit from institutions already in place have strong incentives to 
use their institutional powers to veto proposals for change (Rose/Bernhagen 2010). 
 
On the other hand, as outlined in the introduction, the need to make EU public policy more 
transparent (in MEP Elmar Brok’s words “Who does what, and why?”) persists. Citizens 
expect such transparency against the background of what they are accustomed to at the 
national level. Although any simple duplication of national institutional structures would 
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ignore the specifics of the European political system, declaring the idea of a robust European 
parliamentarianism as utopian could also be a sign of intellectual apathy or constitutional 
fatigue. Despite clear resistance from more and more national party leaders and MPs the case 
against representative democracy in Europe may not be as strong as it seems and the costs of 
making do without it may indeed be high, not least in terms of efficient policy making at a 
continental scale (see Kumm 2008). A European parliamentary, but partially separate powers 
system will certainly be different from any national model (see Bellamy 2010) but in view of 
growing popular discontent about the EU it still seems to be one of the most promising and 
logical avenues, one crucial part of which, against all odds, is arguably a further development 
of a European party system. Under current conditions, the “upside-down nature of the office 
hierarchy means that if a [national political] party faces conflicting incentives in its attempts 
to capture a comparable office at the EU level [or] the national level […], the policy positions 
that favour the capture of domestic office will prevail” (Hix 2008, p. 1261). The challenge 
thus remains to turn the “upside-down” political system the EU represents today into a more 
efficient and accountable system inspired by federal experiences. 
 
The May 2014 lead candidates experiment and the struggle to appoint the Commission 
President with respect to the outcome of the elections is perhaps not yet conclusive. The 
impact of the candidates was extremely variable from member state to member state. The 
EurPPs remained quite invisible on ballots sheets and campaign posters. As Table 1 shows, 
this is not a minor technical question but has a clearly detrimental influence on voters’ 
awareness of the European character of the EP elections. There may be a risk that the 
confrontational tug of war between the European Parliament and the European Council on 
who determines the Commission leader will might deepen many voters’ conviction that the 
European Union is an ineffective and untrustworthy political construction, and opinion in 
academia and the media could follow suit. 
 
On the other hand, the improvements introduced by the European Union to grant a more 
independent standing to the Europarties are beginning to show their effects. The foundations 
are evolving into a dense network of reflection on their proper role and, in particular, that of 
their sister parties (Gagatek and Van Hecke 2011). They start to have an impact on expert 
opinion through scholarly journals and other channels of information. What has been done so 
far may be a small step for European democracy but an important one for European party 
government and the politization of European social issues, opening the way to address the 
much more substantial – and substantive – question whether parties will remain predominantly 
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“responsible” or be able to add an element of “responsiveness” (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel 
2014). The European Parliament, for its part, seems inclined to take up the challenge once 
more and pursue the question of Europarties and, possibly, of electoral reform (hearing of the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee of 4 December 2014). As Andrew Duff pointed out at the 
hearing, a OSCE/ODIHR mission on the conduct of the 2009 EP elections found a lack of 
harmonization of candidacy requirements, including provision for independent candidates, and 
a lack of provisions on voting rights particularly for EU citizens resident in another state It 
recommended more latitude in national legislation for the activities of European-level political 
parties, the unifying of polling days, and measures to ensure independent media monitoring of 
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